Federal Court Jury Awards Former Como Police Chief $50,000 for Racial Discrimination

Federal Court Jury Awards Former Como Police Chief $50,000 for Racial Discrimination.

Jackson State University Accused Of Retaliation By Former Women’s Basketball Coach

Jackson State University Accused Of Retaliation By Former Women’s Basketball Coach.

5th Circuit Reverses Dismissal of Race Discrimination Claim Against Woodforest Bank

On December 21, 2011, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals entered an Opinion reversing Judge Aycock’s prior dismissal of a race discrimination claim against Woodforest Bank.  The Fifth Circuit found that the Court had “impermissibly substituted its judgment concerning the weight of the evidence for the jury’s.”  The facts of case can be found in a prior post.

Vaughn was represented by Jim Waide and Ron Woodruff.

Woodforest was represented by Paula Ardelean and Carlyle White.

http://www.mslitigationreview.com/2011/11/articles/verdicts/388000-verdict-in-northern-district-federal-court-racial-discrimination-case-/index.html

http://www.mslitigationreview.com/2011/11/articles/verdicts/388000-verdict-in-northern-district-federal-court-racial-discrimination-case-/index.html.

Mississippi Senate Accused Of Race Discrimination

Mississippi Senate Accused Of Race Discrimination.

Court documents show that Janice Brown has filed a race discrimination claim pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against the Mississippi State Senate on November 2, 2011.

Fifth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Disability Discrimination Claim Against UPS

On October 19, 2011, the Fifth Circuit entered an Opinion affirming the dismissal of a disability discrimination case against UPS. Plaintiff, Rommel E. Griffin, Sr., brought suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act against his former employer, United Parcel Service, for failing to provide a reasonable employment accommodation in consideration of his diabetes. Griffin maintained that his Type-II diabetic condition qualified as a disability under the ADA because it substantially limited his major life activity of eating. In deposition, Griffin testified that when his blood sugar drops, he begins to perspire and must eat a meal, but that as long as he sticks to his regimen of medication, meals, and rest, his diabetes is manageable. Griffin further testified that the primary restrictions with regard to his diet are to control his portion size, and to refrain from eating fatty, sugary, or otherwise unhealthy foods. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of UPS based on its determination that Griffin was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Griffin appealed.

The Fifth Circuit first recalled that a claimant, to prevail in an ADA claim, must establish that: “1) he has a disability; 2) he is qualified for the position in which he seeks employment; and 3) he was discriminated against because of his disability.” Jenkins v. Cleco Power, LLC, 487 F.3d 309, 315 (5th Cir. 2007). A disability is “[a] physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual[.]” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g). In affirming the District Court, the panel declined Griffin’s invitation to conclude that because diabetes can, as a general matter, be a debilitating condition, and that he could, if he failed to adhere to his dietary regimen, suffer serious health consequences, that his diabetes amounted to a disability under the ADA. The Court criticized this reasoning because it relied on hypothetical generalizations rather than an individual inquiry. The Court further objected that Griffin’s line of reasoning failed to take into account the “admittedly modest dietary measures Griffin must take to mitigate the effects of his condition.” The Court observed that under Griffin’s manner of thinking, all persons with diabetes, lactose intolerance, and food allergies would be disabled under the ADA. The Court, assuming arguendo that Griffin was disabled within the meaning of the ADA, explained that affirmance was otherwise justified since “no reasonable jury could find that UPS failed to reasonably accommodate Griffin’s known disability.” The Court emphasized that nothing in the record supported a finding that UPS was unwilling to, in good faith, participate in an interactive process to reasonably accommodate Griffin’s needs.
Attorney for Griffin was Lisa Brener.
Attorney for UPS was Kim Maria Boyle.

Human Trafficking Class Action Case Filed in Mississippi

Human Trafficking Class Action Case Filed in Mississippi.

Calling Black Employees “Monkeys” Once Is Legal, But Three Times Is Too Much

On September 29, 2011, District Court Judge Henry T. Wingate entered an Opinion and Order denying Upton Tire Pros, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the racial harassment and discrimination claim that had been filed against it. Henry Simmons has alleged in his case that his manager got on the intercom at the tire shop that he worked at, and referred to black employees as “monkeys” on three of four occasions in a few weeks. In the very similar case of Alvondus V. “Jay” Woodruff vs. Upton Tire Pros, Inc., Civil Action No. 3:09-CV-072-TSL-JCS, Mr. Woodruff alleged the comment had only been made once in his presence.  The Court found that the one time comment was not sufficient for racial harassment unlike Mr. Simmons who had been subjected to the racially degrading term on at least three occasions.

Simmons is being represented by Nick Norris and Louis H. Watson, Jr.

Upton Tire Pros, Inc., is being represented by Peyton Irby, Jr. and April Reeves.

Court Rules Employee Owed For Time Riding Back To Main Office

On October 6, 2011, District Court Judge Keith Starrett entered an Order granting and denying in part Miller Enterprises, LLC’s (“Miller”) motion for summary judgment. Aaron Coleman worked as a laborer for Miller, and each day he would arrive at Miller’s main office he would perform various work for Miller before leaving in company trucks with other laborers to perform work at other job sites.  Apparently, Miller paid Coleman for the drive time to the work site, but did not pay him for time riding back to the main office from the work site.  The Court found that if Coleman was required to perform work at the main office at the beginning of the work day that he should have been paid for his time that he was riding back to the main office.

The Court also dismissed Coleman’s race discrimination claim by finding that he could not show that Miller’s proffered reason for his termination was pretextual.  Mr. Coleman’s overtime claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act will proceed to a trial by jury.

Coleman is being represented by Nick Norris and Louis H. Watson, Jr.

Miller is being represented by Christopher Farris.

5th Circuit Reverses Jury Verdict Finding Age Discrimination

On September 21, 2011, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals entered an Opinion reversing the jury verdict finding that Leggett & Platt had discriminated against Jean Frank Phillips based on her age.  Defendant, Leggett & Platt, after consolidating its two Mississippi facilities, informed plaintiff, Jean Frank Phillips, who was employed as an accounts-payable clerk, that she would be laid off. On July 30, 2007, the 66-year-old Leggett was terminated, but four days later was recalled to work on a temporary basis, for an indefinite period. That temporary employment was terminated on January 2, 2008, and 63 days later, Phillips filed an age-discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). She received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC on September 18, 2008, and filed an age discrimination suit on December 16, 2008. Her case proceeded to trial and a jury found Leggett liable for discriminatory termination. Leggett timely filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law urging that Phillips’ suit was time-barred. The District Court denied the motion, holding that Phillips’ action was not barred because her final termination was not until January 2, 2008, less than 180 days from the filing of her EEOC charge. The District Court reasoned that Phillips had been recalled to her same position, hence the adverse employment action came when she was finally terminated on January 2, 2008. Leggett appealed.

Reviewing the question de novo, a panel majority of the Fifth Circuit reversed and
remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Leggett. The Court carefully explained the calculation of the limitations period under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The Court then discussed its precedent that the 180-day limitations period begins on “the date of notice of termination, rather than the final date of employment.” Clark v.
Resistoflex Co., 854 F.2d 762, 765 (5th Cir. 1988). Thus, Phillips’ limitations period began in June 2007 when she was unambiguously informed of her termination. However, the issue here, one of first impression in the Circuit, was “whether temporary, indefinite employment tolls the limitations period.” Reviewing the District Court’s application of
equitable tolling for abuse of discretion, the Court found its application was inappropriate to the facts of Phillips’ case. Here, the finality of Leggetts’ decision to terminate her was never in doubt, even though “[t]he nature and status of Phillips’ temporary employment may have created an awkward situation for filing an EEOC claim.”

Judge Higginbotham dissented from the majority’s holding on equitable tolling finding
it to be a departure from “the fundamental principle that equitable tolling is best entrusted to the trial judge’s sound discretion.” The dissent found that the facts adequately supported the application of equitable tolling, and therefore the District Court had not acted in abuse of its discretion.
Attorney for Appellant- Tommy Siler, Jr., Jackson, MS

Attorney for Appellee -  Shane McLaughlin, Tupelo, MS